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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
"entitlement" and "grievous loss" tests that the Court has used in the past but
seems to apply those tests more strictly than Justice Douglas. With the
addition of Justice Stevens to the Court, the minority in Goss may now be the
majority, with resulting restrictions on the types of interests that are pro-
tected by the fourteenth amendment.
DUANE E. SCHREIMANN
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF UNITED
STATES SECURITIES LAWS
IT v. Vencap, Ltd.'
Richard Pistell, an American citizen residing in the Bahamas, organized
a venture capital firm in the Bahamas. The firm, Vencap Limited (Vencap),
was incorporated in July of 1972 with the aid of a New York law firm and a
Bahamian law firm. Pistell, an internationally known financial analyst and
investment banker, controlled the Vencap stock. 2 Pistell apparently came to
an oral agreement in August with Stanley Graze about a large investment in
Vencap by IT, an international investment trust organized under the laws
of Luxembourg. Graze, a United States citizen and resident of London, had
management control over certain assets of IT. An undated memorandum
of the understanding was prepared at Pistell's instructions sometime there-
after in the Bahamas. During September, Vencap's New York lawyers
prepared a draft of an agreement for an IT subscription to $3,000,000 of
Vencap preferred stock.3 Before the subscription, Vencap's capitalization
totalled $5,000. The terms expressed in the memorandum and in the final
agreement were not favorable to the preferred shareholders. 4 Although it is
711 (7th Cir. 1974); Shirck v. Thomas, 486 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1973) (opinion written
by Justice Stevens); Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973) (opinion written by Justice Stevens).
1. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
2. Pistell and a secdnd internationally known financier, Court Armoury de
Reincourt, a French citizen residing in Paris or Geneva, held virtually all the common
stock. Id. at 1005.
3. The agreement also provided IIT warrants to purchase an additional
$3,000,000 of such shares exercisable at the same price within three years of closing.
Id. at 1006.
4. The preferential capital investors of $3,000,000 would receive only a 6%
non-cumulative dividend, if earned and declared by directors elected solely by the
common stockholders, and a further dividend of a third of the remaining profits, if
and when so declared, whereas the common stockholders, with a $4,000 investment
would have the benefit of two-thirds of such earnings. Id at 1011. The preferred
stock was redeemable at par plus 6% dividends at any time. Id. at 1012.
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not clear whether the agreement was prepared in New York or in the
Bahamas, drafts were exchanged between the law firms of New York and
Nassau. The agreement, dated September 29, 1972, was signed in the
Bahamas on behalf of IT by Milton Meissner, the president of IOS, Ltd.
and IT Management Co., S.A. Closing occurred in the Bahamas in
October.
Beginning in January, 1973, Pistell allegedly began to funnel substantial
amounts of Vencap's funds into his own hands for his personal use. He did
so by causing Vencap to initiate a series of transactions, in large part from the
address of the New York law firm which performed services for Vencap. An
action for fraud, conversion, and corporate waste was brought in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York by IT and three
Luxembourg citizens appointed in Luxembourg to liquidate IIT. The
district court issued an order enjoining Vencap, Pistell, and other corporate
defendants controlled by Pistell, from exercising control over the assets of
1IT or corporations in which IHT held an interest. The court also appointed
a receiver pending a final hearing. Defendants appealed the order, claim-
ing, inter alia, that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Second
Circuit held that a finding of jurisdiction could be based on defendants'
activities in the United States, and retained jurisdiction pending further
findings and conclusions by the district court.
After dismissing other possible bases of subject matter jurisdiction as
inappropriate, the court determined that jurisdiction depended on the
provisions of the securities laws-section 22(a) of the Security Act of 1933- or
section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1 under which various
theories of fraud were alleged. Three grounds were advanced by which the
United States securities laws might be applied to the alleged fraud, as
distinguished from law of any other country: (1) the American citizenship of
one defendant Richard Pistell, (2) the effects of fraudulent activities on
American interests, and (3) the occurrence of fraudulent activity within the
United States.
1. Citizenship of the defendant (nationality principle)
The American citizenship of defendant Pistell could provide subject
matter jurisdiction according to the nationality or personality principle of
jurisdiction, whereby the United States clearly has the power to prescribe the
conduct of its nationals everywhere in the world.7 No United States court has
yet applied the securities law solely on the basis of the defendant's national-
ity. Accordingly, the lIT court did not consider Pistell's citizenship suffi-
dent, on the ground that Congress never intended the securities laws to be
5. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1970).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED
STATES § 30 (1965). See also Comment, The Transnational Reach of Rule lOb-5, 121 U.
PA. L. REv. 1363, 1387 (1973).
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applied to the full extent of constitutional power.8 This decision is consistent
with prior cases where the finding of jurisdiction was supported by other
grounds, although the nationality of the defendant was clearly considered
significant. 9
8. As Judge Friendly stated in the companion case of Bersch v. DrexelFirestone,
Inc., "[I]t would be. . .erroneous to assume that the legislature always means to go to
the full extent permitted." 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied Bersch v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 96 S. Ct. 453 (1975). The Bersch case was a class action for
fraud and misrepresentation brought by a shareholder of I.O.S. Ltd. purporting to
represent up to 100,000 purchasers of shares, both American and foreign. The
major defendants were underwriters involved in three separate large offerings of
I.O.S. stock. The court found that the prospectus emanated from a foreign source
and therefore could not be a proper basis for jurisdiction. The court also found that
the adverse effects of the collapse of the I.O.S. empire on United States general
economic interests and the prices of other American securities were an insufficientjurisdictional basis. The court stated that for adverse effects of foreign activity to
support jurisdiction there must be injury to purchasers or sellers of those securities in
whom the United States has an interest-either purchasers or sellers of the very
securities concerned or other securities of the same issue. Id. at 991. The precise
holding of Bersch was that the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws:
(1) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident in the
United States whether or not acts (or culpable failures to act) of material
importance occurred in this country; and
(2) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident abroad if,
but only if, acts (or culpable failures to act) of material importance in the
United States have significantly contributed thereto; but
(3) Do not apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners outside the
United States unless acts (or culpable failures to act) within the United
States directly caused such losses.
Id. at 993. Judge Friendly authored the opinions in both Bersch and lIT, and also in
the Leasco decision. See Note, 11 TEX. INT. L.J. 173 (1976).
9. See, e.g., SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir.
1973) (jurisdiction based on findings that foreign companies were controlled from
the United States. Americans held some shares and defendants used the U.S. mails.
The HT court felt the result would have been the same in this case even if the
defendant had not been an American). Cf., Finch v. Marathon Securities Corp., 316
F. Supp. 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (no finding of jurisdiction. In an otherwise wholly
foreign transaction, the American nationality of parties who controlled an off-shore
mutual fund was considered significant but not sufficient).
The court in Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell indicated that
Congress did not intend the Act to govern every instance throughout the world
where an American company buys or sells a security. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
The Leasco court expressed doubt that § 10(b) would apply if all misrepresentations
were made in England, securities were purchased in England of an English corpora-
tion not traded in an organized American securities market, and the only U.S.
connection was that the buyer was a U.S. corporation listed on the New York Stock
Exchange with U.S. shareholders. See also Garnerv. Pearson, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,549 (M.D. Fla. 1974), which states that § 10(b) would not cover foreign transac-
tions and foreign securities if the only connection with the U.S. were the citizenship
of the purchaser or seller.
Judge Friendly expressly held in Bersch that the American citizenship of inves-
tors resident abroad would not of itself be sufficient to invoke subject matterjurisdiction. This holding, however, addressed the nationality of the plaintiffs rather
(Vol. 42
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2. Effects in the United States (objective territoriality principle)
Pistell's activities were alleged to have had significant effects within the
United States because 300 of the fundholders of IIT, who allegedly
suffered harm, were resident citizens of the United States. When the effects
of certain activity have occurred within the territory, jurisdiction may be
asserted on the principle of objective territoriality. 10 The lIT court rejected
this basis of jurisdiction, explaining that the 300 Americans would represent
only .2% of all IIT's fundholders, and their investment wouldrepresent only
.5% (about $15,000) of the total IIT investment in Vencap. In comparison
with the effect outside the United States, the effect within was deemed
insignificant." The court again concluded that Congress had not intended
the Act to apply to such a transaction. It decided that the investment losses to
American investors were not a substantial effect within the United States as
contemplated by the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law.'2
than that of the defendants. The Securities Exchange Commission has suggested that
the issuing of securities by an American firm only to foreign nationals on foreign
markets is generally understood as not "a public offering" within the meaning of the
Act. Securities Act Release No. 4708, 29 Fed. Reg. 9828 (1964). See also Comment,
The Transnational Reach of Rule 10b-5, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1363, 1387-89 (1973).
10. Legislation is presumed to apply only territorially, unless a contrary intent
is clearly manifest. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357
(1909); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 577-79 (1953); Kook v. Crang, 182 F.
Supp. 388, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). The concept of territoriality was extended in the
Case of the S.S. "Lotus" P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 10 (1927), [1927-1928] Ann. Dig. 153
(No. 98), 22 AM. J. INT'L. 8 (1928), which stated that legislative assertion of
jurisdiction over conduct outside the territory of a state is lawful unless it violates a
prohibitive rule of international law. Support for the principle of Lotus is found in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 18
(1965), which goes beyond the pure territorial principle, asserting jurisdiction over
an alien for activity that takes place wholly abroad if a substantial effect occurs within
the state. See generally Committee Report by the Committee on International Law, 21
RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 240 (1966).
11. Because 1IT itself, rather than its fundholders, was allegedly defrauded,
"[t]he American residence or citizenship of certain fundholders. . . [is]. . . impor-
tant only on a theory akin to that of piercing the corporate veil." 519 F.2d at 1017. But
piercing the veil would lead to a result almost wholly non-American because most of
the fundholders were not Americans. The fraud in Bersch was allegedly perpetrated
on individual American purchasers directly. The nationality of the shareholders was
more significant because these shareholders rather than the corporation were the
defrauded parties.
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 18 (1965) provides in part:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal conse-
quences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect
within its territory, if either
(a) .... or
(b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to
which the rule applies;
(ii) the effect within the territory is substantial;
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The court said that the transaction did not come within the formulation
of Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook.'3 Schoenbaum involved the sale of stock of Banff
Oil Ltd., a Canadian corporation which conducted all its operations in
Canada. Negotiations, the exchange of offer and acceptance, the delivery of
shares, and payment all took place in Canada. Banff stock was listed on the
American Stock Exchange and on the Toronto Exchange, and there were
many American shareholders. The court's reason for asserting jurisdiction
was the protective principle, under which jurisdiction exists because of the
potentially adverse effect upon United States interests. There need not be
any actual effect in the country, even when all the elements of the crime
occur abroad. 14 The Schoenbaum court applied the United States securities
laws to protect the interests of the United States and its investors from the
harmful effects of improper foreign transactions. The interests of the
United States involved protection of its securities market and its domestic
stock exchange. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell15 limited
the broad Schoenbaum formulation. Now an adverse effect alone is insuffi-
cient for subject matter jurisdiction, if all fraudulent conduct occurred
abroad and the securities were foreign securities not traded on a United
States exchange.
16
The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law requires that the effect within
the territory be substantial and occur as a direct and foreseeable result of the
conduct outside the territory.' 7 The Restatement expands the rule laid down
in United States v. Aluminum Company of America,18 which found certain
(iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally
recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
13. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
14. The Schoenbaum court did require an actual adverse effect in the U.S.,
which was alleged in the losses suffered by American investors and the use of an
American stock exchange. But the protective principle as enunciated in the Restate-
ment refers to jurisdiction of a state to prescribe rules of law attaching legal
consequences to extraterritorial conduct threatening "its security as a state," pro-
vided that the conduct is generally recognized as a crime. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 33 (1965).
15. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
16. The Bersch court followed this approach, stating that the "adverse effects"
test is limited to fraudulent acts resulting in injury to purchasers and sellers of those
securities in whom the U.S. has an interest. 519 F.2d at 989. See also Note, Securities
Regulation, 11 TEX. INT. L.J. 173, 179 (1976); Mizrack, Recent Developments in the
Extraterritorial Application of Section 10(b) of the Securities & Exchange Act of 1934, 30
Bus. LAWYER 367, 379-81 (1975).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, Explanatory Notes § 18, comment f at 50 (1965). The Schoenbaum court did
not mention foreseeability as a test of jurisdiction, although the result may have been
foreseeable. See Becker, Extraterritorial Dimensions of the Securities Exchange Act, 2
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 233, 241 (1969). See also Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 405
F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969) (the movement of millions of
dollars between New York banks was a direct and foreseeable consequence).
18. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (Anti-trust action).
[Vol. 42
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agreements unlawful, although made abroad, if they were intended to affect
imports and did affect them.19 This requirement of intention or foreseeabil-
ity as to effects in the United States may prove to be very important in the
application of the securities laws.20 The 11T court found that the Vencap
shares apparently were not intended to be offered to American residents or
citizens.2 1
The court's determination that the losses to American investors were
not a substantial effect in the United States initially seems questionable. A
loss of $15,000 involving 300 Americans appears substantial when viewed
alone.2 2 Commentators have suggested that the requirement of substantial-
ity of Schoenbaum for protective jurisdiction should be defined with respect
to the significance of the harm threatened, and not in relation to the
importance of a domestic act in the overall transaction. 23 Protective jurisdic-
tion concerns the impact of foreign activities on domestic markets viewed
independently, whereas territorial jurisdiction is concerned with the relative
magnitude of the domestic event in relation to effects abroad. 24 The lIT
court did not adopt the protective principle of Schoenbaumin this regard, but
rather employed the territorial principle. The concept of territoriality is
19. Both Aluminum Co. and Schoenbaum relied in part on a statement of Justice
Holmes from Strassheim v. Daly, 221 U.S. 280 (1911):
Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing
detrimental effects within it, justify a state in punishing the cause of the
harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the state should succeed in
getting him within its power.
Id. at 284-85. Becker applies the Aluminum Co. rule to securities law and arrives at the
following formulation: ". . . [I]f a securities transaction would be unlawful under
the Exchange Act were it made in the United States, it is unlawful though made
abroad if it is intended to and does affect securities transactions in the United States."
Becker, supra note 17, at 236. The rule of course is subject to the broader or narrower
scope of the Securities Exchange Act itself.
20. Cf. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 989 (1975), cert. denied,
Bersch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 96 S. Ct. 453 (1976), where adverse effects on
general U.S. economic interests or on prices of American securities, when it was not
intended or foreseeable that securities would be offered to anyone in the United
States, were an insufficient ground for jurisdiction. See generally Von Mehren &
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121,
1127 (1966).
21. 519 F.2d at 1017. The court also noted that IIT's prospectus stated that
shares were "neither offered for sale nor sold to U.S. citizens or U.S. residents." Id. at
1016.
22. In SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973),
involving conduct within the United States and injury to United States domestic
investors, the court stated that it was not the number of investors involved that was
crucial, but rather activities in the United States and the impact on American
investors-a clear application of the protective principle according to Schoenbaum.
23. See Brown, Offshore Mutual Funds: Extraterritorial Application of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1225, 1241-54 (1972); Mizrack,
supra note 16, at 380.
24. See Brown, supra note 23, at 1248-49.
1977]
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inconsistent with a result whereby a corporation, the shares of which are
internationally owned, would be subject to the valid assertion of plenary
jurisdiction to regulate its internal affairs by each state in which it happened
to have shareholders.25 According to the territorial principle, an effect in the
United States, which may be deemed "substantial" when viewed purely
internally, may become totally insubstantial when measured on a broader
scale.26 The IT court adopted this approach on the basis that Congress
would not have intended otherwise.
3. Conduct in the United States (subjective territoriality principle)
The final ground considered by the court for finding jurisdiction was
activity within the United States.2 7 The applicable principle has sometimes
been called subjective territoriality.28 The IlTcourt said, "We do not think
Congress intended to allow the United States to be used as a base for
manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even when these are
peddled only to foreigners." 29 A number of cases have found jurisdiction
because of conduct within the United States, although in none of these cases
was domestic activity the sole link with the United States. 30
Leasco is as important a case to the development of the subjective
territoriality principle as it is to the objective territoriality principle. For
jurisdiction, Leasco required injury to a protected United States person or
interest, a transaction violative of the Act, and significant conduct in the
United States directly related to the ultimate act which caused the harm.
Leasco limited Schoenbaum by requiring conduct within the United States in
25. See Committee Report by the Committee on International Law, 21 RECORD OF
N.Y.C.B.A. 240, 252 (1966).
26. Id. at 251. The court in Investment Properties Int'l, Ltd. v. LO.S. Ltd., CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,011 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd by an expedited appeal, [1971-72
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,446, mandamus granted to allow limited
discovery to determine jurisdiction and standing, 459 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1972), framed the
test as follows: if a transaction has occurred outside the U.S. is there significant
impact on the domestic securities market or on domestic investors, so that extrater-
ritorial application is necessary to protect securities trading in the U.S. or U.S.
investors?
27. See Mizrack, Recent Developments in the Extraterritorial Application of Section
10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 30 Bus. LAWYER 367, 384 (1975).
28. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 17 (1965).
29. 519 F.2d at 1017.
30. See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952) (suit by American
company to enjoin U.S. citizen residing in Texas from using company's trademark,
registered under U.S. law, in Mexico on watches assembled in Mexico from parts
purchased in Switzerland and the United States); Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473
F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973) (use of telephone, mails, and other facilities of interstate
commerce between Canada and St. Louis, Mo.); Ferraioli v. Cantor, 259 F. Supp. 842
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (transfer of control to a Canadian corporation of a U.S. corporation
in New York was sufficient conduct in the United States for jurisdictional purposes.
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addition to an adverse effect, rather than an adverse effect alone. At the
same time, the Leasco case established conduct within the United States as a
primary basis of subject matter jurisdiction. The protective principle dis-
cussed above is inapposite here, because it relates to effects within the United
States or the possibility of effects in the United States of activity abroad.
IlTgoes beyond Leasco and Schoenbaum, because there was no finding in
IITof an injury to a protected United States person or interest. Section 17 of
the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law provides that a rule of law prescribed
by a nation may deal with effects of any conduct that occurs in its territory,
whether or not such effects take place in its territory.3 1 Therefore, the
Restatement directly supports the liT decision.
The IlTcourt restricted the basis of jurisdiction to "the perpetration of
fraudulent acts themselves and. . . not. . . to mere preparatory activities
or the failure to prevent fraudulent acts where the bulk of the activity was
performed in foreign countries."3 2 The court admitted that the distinction is
a fine one. It could present serious problems of application, but was useful to
the court in disposing of the five asserted theories of fraudulent activity.
The manner of perpetrating the fraud could be decisive as to whether
the court had subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. For purposes of
three of the five theories of fraud advanced, the only apparently relevant
conduct in the United States was the exchange of drafts of the purchase
agreement between American attorneys for IIT and Vencap. Even if the
agreement was merely a memorialization of a previously completed deal, the
exchange of drafts was little more than preparatory or incidental activity. As
for the remaining two theories advanced, numerous transactions originat-
ing from the address of the New York law firm after the sale of the shares
could well have been the substantive acts consummating the fraud. This
would certainly be significant conduct within the United States.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, Explanatory Notes § 17, comment (a) and Illustration 2 at 45 (1965).
Illustration 2 is quoted approvingly in Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334, n.3:
X and Yare in state A. Xmakes a misrepresentation to Y. Xand Ygo to
state B. Solely because of the prior misrepresentation, Ydelivers money to
X. A has jurisdiction to prescribe a criminal penalty for obtaining money by
false pretenses.
SEC v. Kasser, 391 F. Supp. 1167 (D.N.J. 1975), decided one month before HIT,
reached the opposite result. The court found no direct impact, and decided that a
considerable amount of conduct in the United States alone was not sufficient for
subject matter jurisdiction. The court also framed its inquiry in terms of congres-
sional intent. The court in F.O.F. Proprietary Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Young& Co., 400 F.
Supp. 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), decided several months after Berschand lIT, stated that
the BerschIiT analysis requires an evaluation of whether Congress would have
intended the Act to apply to the circumstances of the case. The court found no acts in
the United States directly causing losses abroad, and therefore no subject matter
jurisdiction.
32. 519 F.2d at 1018. Judge Friendly stated the same day in Bersch, "While
merely preparatory activities in the United States are not enough to trigger applica-
tion of the securities laws for injury to foreigners located abroad, they are sufficient
when the injury is to Americans so resident." 519 F.2d at 992.
1977]
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The amount and type of conduct within the United States sufficient to
be deemed significant is not clear. In Kook v. Crang33 use of the mails and
telephone was insufficient for jurisdictional purposes. The court in SEC v.
Gulf Intercontinental Finance Corp.,34 applying a broader rule than that of
Kook, stated that the use of interstate facilities, including the mails, as an
essential part of a fraudulent scheme, is a valid jurisdictional base. 5 The
court in Ferraioli v. Cantor3 6 decided that transfer of control of a corporation
in New York, as an inseparable part of a total transaction, was sufficient
conduct in the United States. The Leasco court declined to decide if use of the
telephone or mails alone would constitute jurisdictional grounds.3 7 Leasco
seems to require that the actual misrepresentation occur in the United
States.
A case from the Eighth Circuit, Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd.,38 may
indicate the minimum contacts with the United States necessary for a finding
of jurisdiction. Travis involved foreign securities not purchased on a United
States exchange. The defendants were never present in the United States
(Missouri) for purposes of the fraud, 39 but there was extensive use of the
mails and telephone across state and national borders. This was held
sufficient, along the lines of the Restatement4 °
The exchange of drafts of the agreement in 1ITand the exchange of
letters and telephone calls in Travis may appear to be equally tenuous
contacts with the United States. However,. the exchanges in Travis were the
very acts of misrepresentation, and so supported subject matter jurisdiction;
while the exchanges in lIT were insufficient contacts because they were
merely preparatory to the alleged fraud. The lITtransactions subsequent to
the sale of the preferred Vencap stock, i.e., purchases and sales of other
securities in the United States, movement of funds, and extensive use of the
mails and telephone from New York, clearly seem a sufficient basis for
jurisdiction in light of Gulf Intercontinental and Travis.
33. 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
34. 223 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla. 1963).
35. Id. at 995-96.
36. 259 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
37. The case of Garner v. Pearson, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,549 (M.D. Fla.
1974), involved use of the mails and other facilities of interstate commerce. There
were a number of transactions, only three of which occurred in the United States. It is
not clear, but Garner may indicate that the purchase or sale in the United States of
securities not traded on an organized market is itself enough for subject matter
jurisdiction. Cf. Madonick v. Denison Mines, Ltd., 63 F.R.D. 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
where dissemination in the United States of a proxy statement was considered
significant conduct in the U.S.
38. 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973). The court noted that the use of the facilities of
interstate commerce must be more than incidental. 473 F.2d at 526, n.21.
39. The defendants never appeared in Missouri except for the closing of the
sale of the plaintiffs' securities to one of the defendant companies, at a time when
plaintiffs were aware of the defendants' true intentions and thus were not misled.
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 17 (1965).
[Vol. 42
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A requirement that conduct within the territory be significant or an
essential link in the transaction is a flexible standard well-suited for protect-
ing the interests of a state in regulating conduct within its borders. 41 It
applies the protective principle of jurisdiction more truly than does Leasco,
which may require that the actual misrepresentation occur internally.42 The
requirement may be less compatible with the territorial principle, although it
does protect the interests of all nations wherein substantial conduct has
occurred.
The courts consistently frame the inquiry of whether United States
securities laws should be applied extraterritorially in terms of congressional
intent.43 The approach to a finding or denial of jurisdiction is pragmatic
rather than mechanical. 4 Indeed, jurisdictional analysis should not wholly
depend on rigid categories of principles. 45 A comprehensive policy analysis
wherein categorized jurisdictional principles serve a descriptive function
rather than a normative one would seem more useful. Congress has indi-
cated its intention to limit the applicability of the securities laws by section
30(b) of the 1934 Act.46 Enforceability of the United States securities laws is
also limited by domestic policies of other nations.47 Application of United
States securities laws in violation of international choice-of-law principles
would result in serious problems, not only of enforceability outside United
41. See Comment, The Transnational Reach of Rule IOb-5, 121 U. PA. L. REV.
1363, 1375 (1973). As to the standard of substantiality for jurisdiction over adverse
effects within the territory, see Brown, Offshore Mutual Funds: ExtraterritorialApplica-
tion of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1225, 1254
(1972); Goldman & Magrino, Some Foreign Aspects of Securities Regulation: Towards a
Reevaluation of Section 30(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,55 VA. L. REV. 1015,
1020 (1969).
42. The requirement that the actual misrepresentation take place in the United
States does not take account of the nature of transnational securities dealings. The
situs of a particular misrepresentation may be unimportant for purposes of the
transaction. The interest of the state is identical whether the particular misrepresen-
tation occurs within or without its territory. See Comment, The TransnationalReach of
Rule 10b-5, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1375 (1973).
43. See Brown, Offshore Mutual Funds: Extraterritorial Application of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1225, 1238-49 (1972).
44. See Mizrack, Recent Developments in the Extraterritorial Application of Section
10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 30 Bus. LAWYER 367, 384-86 (1975).
45. Both the Bersch court, 519 F.2d at 986, and the Travis court, 473 F.2d at
523-24, n.14, noted that they were not bound by the facts of prior cases. See
Comment, The Transnational Reach of Rule 10b-5, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1384
(1973).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1970) exempts certain professionals transacting
business outside United States' territory.
47. The principles expressed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAw OFTHE UNITED STATES §§ 17, 18 (1965) reflect principles of United States
municipal law (i.e. domestic law) rather than principles of international law.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 (1971), "Causing Effects in State
by Act Done Elsewhere," provides that the power of a state to exercise judicial
jurisdiction is limited by considerations of reasonableness.
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